The Case of Mr Ahmed Zaoui
As the substantial litigation involving Mr Zaoui will be a focus of this paper, it is also useful at this point to examine the background underlying these proceedings. the Inspector-General on such a review was to determine whether: the information that led to the making of the certificate was properly regarded as classified security information; the information was credible; and whether the person in question was properly covered by the criteria.
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The Inspector-General 13 issued an interlocutory decision on 15 October 2003 concerning the manner in which he proposed to conduct his review of the security risk certificate. This led Mr Zaoui to bring an application for judicial review of that interlocutory decision. Eventually, the review of the security risk certificate by the Inspector-General was begun but it did not reach a conclusion. Part way through the Inspector-General"s hearing, the security risk certificate was withdrawn as a result of a settlement reached between the parties.
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Inspector-General shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister following consultation with the Leader of the Opposition and that no person shall be appointed as the InspectorGeneral unless that person has previously held office as a judge of the High Court of New Zealand. 12 Ibid, s 114I(4). Note, under s 163 of the 2009 Act, the Minister has the power to certify that a person constitutes a threat or risk to security. Once this certification has been made the Governor-General may, by Order in Council, order the deportation from New Zealand of that person. Review proceedings are able to be brought in respect of a statutory power of decision arising out of or under the Act (s 247). 13 Proceedings were brought against the Inspector-General alleging apparent bias after statements given to the media regarding the case. The High Court held that there was a real possibility of apparent bias against Mr Zaoui when undertaking the review of the Director"s decision: Zaoui v Greig HC AK CIV-2994-404-317, 31 March 2004. The then Inspector-General resigned after this decision and was replaced by another InspectorGeneral. 14 The decisions relating to that judicial review issue were as follows: 18 The undertakings that Mr Zaoui provided to the Director of Security, that led to the withdrawal of the security risk certificate, are recorded at http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/asset/Undertakings.pdf.
Part B The Use of Classified Information in Immigration Decision-Making
The issue as to the correct balance between the right to due process and the protection of national security, including the use of classified information in immigration decision-making, is often acknowledged to be vexed. 19 Significantly, this was of major importance in the Zaoui case and a pivotal aspect of discussion throughout the legislative history of the 2009 Act.
The Statutory Context
The 1987 Act had been amended in 1999 to introduce statutory provisions for refugee determinations and also to add procedures relating to the protection of national security.
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One aspect of the 1999 amendments was to allow secret classified security information 21 held by the SIS to be used to determine security risk in immigration matters and lead to the issuing of security risk certificates without disclosing that information to the affected person. 22 Prior to its insertion, decision-makers in New Zealand were not able to withhold information held about non-citizens as deported persons had the right to access all information held about them. 23 Concerns that this requirement could impede intelligence-gathering operations and sources led to the 1999 amendment.
As In the preliminary interlocutory procedural decision referred to above, the Inspector-General had stated that his role in the review was to consider Mr Zaoui"s security risk rather than any international human rights obligations, and that Mr Zaoui had no right to a summary of allegations underlying the certificate because classified security information could not be divulged to him. Judicial review proceedings 26 were brought with regard to this interlocutory decision.
The security risk certificate and classified information
The Inspector-General"s stance that Mr Zaoui was not entitled to a summary of the allegations that led to issuing of the certificate provided clear due process and natural justice concerns. Mr Zaoui on judicial review sought declarations that the Inspector-General"s ruling was unlawful, ultra vires and in breach inter alia of the right to justice under s 27(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the New Zealand Bill of Rights).
In the High Court, Williams J acknowledged the importance of Mr Zaoui"s right to natural justice through holding that the relevant statutory provisions did not debar the provision to Mr Zaoui of a summary of allegations against which the certificate had been made. 27 It was emphasised by Williams J that the right of a person subject to a certificate to know at least the outline of the allegations against them and the basis on which they were made was one of the most fundamental tenets of natural justice and should be implemented as far as was consistent 24 Immigration Act, s 114C(4)(a). Section 72 provided that where the Minister certified that the continued presence in New Zealand of any person named in the certificate constituted a threat to national security, the Governor-General could, by Order in Council, order the deportation from New Zealand of that person. 25 Ibid, s 114C(5)(a). Article 33.2 of the Refugee Convention provides the exception to the general obligation of non-refoulement provided within the Convention. Article 33. 1 provides that no Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. However art 33.2 provides that the benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 26 See above n 14. 27 Zaoui v Attorney-General with the definition of "classified security information". 28 These recommendations were complied with and were not challenged on appeal.
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The judicial recognition of the importance of the right to natural justice provides a vivid illustration of the need for an adequate balance between the competing interests of national security and human rights to be struck.
Accordingly, the steps taken in the High Court can be seen to have signalled recognition that the 1987 Act had to be supplemented with adequate procedural safeguards to deal with one of its stated objects which was to ensure the protection for the rights of any individual affected by the use of classified security information. In particular, at Select Committee stage a number of changes were recommended to ensure that greater weight was given to natural justice within the proposed legislation including reducing the scope of the proposed definition of classified information, removing the ability to use classified information in decision-making where the information referred to matters that would have a "significant impact on New Zealand"s international reputation" and providing that prejudicial information could only be used in decision-making if a summary of allegations was provided to the affected individual. 31 The proposed provision regarding the There it was noted that it was incumbent on the Director to provide as much information as possible (without risking the disclosure of the actual classified information) on why the information is classified, the content of the information and why it is considered credible. This is to enable the person to make submissions and provide evidence with the benefit of as much information as possible. It was also stressed that in order for information to be classified it must meet the statutory criteria (which included that disclosure would prejudice New Zealand"s security 33 Immigration Act s 35(3). Note, however, this obligation is subject to the fact that the Tribunal must be given access to classified information that is the subject of an appeal to the Tribunal (s 241(1) ) and the Tribunal and the courts must be given access to classified information that is relied on in making a decision that is appealed or is the subject of review proceedings under the 2009 Act (s 259(1)). 34 Ibid, s 36. 35 Now under s 7(1) of the Act information can only be deemed classified by a chief executive of one of the 14 relevant agencies defined by the Act. While s 33 provides that classified information may be relied on in making decisions or determining proceedings under the Act if the Minister determines that the classified information relates to "matters of security or criminal conduct", thus there is no reference to matters that would impact upon New Zealand"s international reputation in the Act. The requirement for a summary of the allegations arising from the classified information is provided for in s 38(2 
The Use of Special Advocates
Action was also taken to ensure Mr Zaoui"s right to natural justice was fairly represented in the course of the eventual hearing of the review of the security risk certificate by the Inspector-General. 39 Under the statutory powers granted to the Inspector-General, 40 the
Inspector-General appointed two special advocates entrusted with the task of representing Mr
Zaoui"s interests in relation to the classified information that was relied upon by the Director. 41 The special advocates were able to view the SIS material that had not been disclosed to Mr Zaoui and make challenges to that material in closed proceedings. However, the special advocates were unable to communicate with Mr Zaoui about the content of the classified information nor receive instructions regarding the information.
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Because the security risk certificate was withdrawn, the effectiveness of the special advocate function has not yet been tested within the New Zealand context. Nevertheless, a significant consequence of the Zaoui litigation has been the introduction of provisions relating to special advocates into the 2009 Act. In that Act, a special advocate is defined to be a lawyer who has been recognised as a special advocate by an agency designated for that purpose by the Prime
Minister. 43 The role of the special advocate is to represent a person who is the subject of a decision made involving classified information or proceedings involving classified information. 44 Thus, in a situation where a prejudicial decision is made against an individual 38 Tennant above n 19 at 9. 39 As noted above, this hearing commenced but was not completed in light of the withdrawl of Mr Zaoui"s security risk certificate. 
Do special advocates adequately address the balance?
Commentators appear to be in agreement that the introduction of the special advocate into New Zealand"s immigration legislation does go some way to ensuring that adequate safeguards against the potential abuse of the use of classified information are put in place. With regard to the statutory restrictions placed on the communications between the special advocate and the affected person, Ip argues that such provisions will significantly impair communications between special advocates and those whose interests they represent, thereby rendering it more difficult for special advocates to mitigate the unfairness that is inherent in the non-disclosure of classified information. 53 The true effectiveness of the special advocate function in light of these criticisms and restrictions remains to be tested.
Part C Detention
The right to be free from arbitrary detention is another fundamental human right that must be balanced with the need to protect national security. It is thus unsurprising that the tension between the right of the state to detain and the rights of individuals has been at issue within the New Zealand context. Residents could also reside in family groups. They were expected to observe the rules of the centre but a statement of residents" rights, including the right to legal advice, was provided to the detainees.
Attorney-General v Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc
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Contents of the Operational Instruction
In order to examine the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in the case, it is necessary briefly to explore the contents of the operational instruction that was the focus of the proceedings. The instruction was divided into two parts. The first part was general but stated that care must be exercised before invocation of the detention power. It then set out a number of reasons for caution, including that those whose claim for refugee status is genuine will already have a well-founded fear of persecution and a consequent entitlement to protection. For those persons, detention, even for a short period, would be traumatic. There was a reference to art 31 of the Refugee Convention and the UNHCR guidelines on detention and the fact that it is generally accepted that detention of refugee status claimants should only occur where necessary. There was also reference to the fact that claimants, who wish to prepare a claim and pursue any rights of appeal, could be held in custody for a not inconsiderable period of time.
55 Section 128 covered actions that were to be taken with regard to persons who arrived in New Zealand and who did not receive a permit. Section 128(5) provided that on the request of an immigration officer to a member of the police, any person to whom this section applied had to be be detained by a member of the police and placed in custody pending that person's departure from New Zealand on the first available craft. 56 See Appendix A and B of Attorney-General v Refugee Council of New Zealand Inc above n 54.
It then stated that detention of a refugee status claimant could, however, be justified particularly where interests of national security or public order and safety arose and that any decision would depend upon a close assessment of all the factors relating to the arrival:
"These [factors] may include the extent to which that person is able to provide accurate and reliable information as to their identity, the apparent strength or weakness of their claim and the extent to which there are identified risks to public health, safety, security and order. An assessment of risk to public safety, security, and order will need to take account of the prevailing security situation, both in New Zealand and globally."
The instruction also stated that whether detention was justified would also depend upon the type of detention envisaged as there was a distinction in the guidelines between detention in a prison environment and accommodation at an open centre (the Mangere Centre) with some restrictions on freedom of movement. The instruction then set out factors that would assist in deciding whether or not in a particular case detention was justified and the type of detention.
It set out such criteria under two headings -a heading related to possible detention in a penal institution (reserved for cases where there were public order or particular security concerns) and detention at the Mangere centre. At the end, it reiterated that all cases depend upon an individual assessment of circumstances.
Judicial Examination of the Validity of the Operational Instruction
In the High Court, Baragwanath J had found the operational instruction to be unlawful as being inconsistent with the Refugee Convention and directed to the place where the detention should take place rather than to whether there should be any detention at all, thus constituting an improper fetter on the statutory obligations of immigration officers at the border.
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In nothing in the operational instruction that could be seen to conflict with arts 31 and 33 of the convention.
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While reference was made by Tipping J to the fact that, following the issuing of the instruction, the proportion of refugee claimants detained at the border dramatically increased, he did not consider it appropriate to allow the decision on the lawfulness of the instruction itself to be coloured by its implementation. Tipping J emphasised that immigration officers could not ignore the risk to national security that must have occurred following the events of September 11, and a general trend following such an event would not be a satisfactory basis to decide whether the Immigration Service was or was not lawfully implementing its statutory powers under the permit. 
Subsequent Developments
The Legislature also acted in response to the case. Prior to Baragwanath J"s finding that the operational instruction was unlawful, he had issued an interim judgment holding that, although s 128(5) of the 1987 Act did create a power to detain claimants for refugee status, any person detained could apply to the District Court for bail under s 128A. As this was a possibility that had not been advanced by the plaintiffs it was necessary to defer a final judgment to allow the Crown to make submissions. 68 The Legislature acted quickly and a month after the delivery of Baragwanath J"s interim judgment it introduced an amendment to the 1987 Act which allowed for conditional release of certain detainees, including refugee claimants. 
Zaoui v Attorney-General
The case of Mr Zaoui also led to a judicial examination of the limits that should be placed on the ability to detain non-citizens under the 1987 Act. Upon arrival in New Zealand, Mr Zaoui spent more than 23 months in a maximum security prison. 72 He sought an order for his release on bail or an order of habeas corpus. The case eventually came before the Supreme Court where a key issue was whether the High Court had jurisdiction or power to order a detainee"s release on bail from detention under a warrant issued because of concerns about national security.
As acknowledged by the Supreme Court, the case was one in which the tension between the protection of human rights and the protection of national security was clearly apparent. As was summarised by the Court:
73 This is a case where national security issues arise. It is also a case about the liberty of someone who has refugee status in New Zealand and who is entitled to the benefit of the Refugee Convention requirement that only such restrictions upon his liberty as are necessary should be imposed upon him. The applications fall to be considered against the background of concern for liberty recognised by the Bill of Rights Act and the common law. Accordingly the case raises significant matters of public interest which require careful balance.
Considering whether the security provision of the 1987 Act precluded the exercise of the High Court"s inherent jurisdiction to grant bail, the Court emphasised that the interests of 70 The The Court emphasised that it was of prime importance that any powers of detention be approached in light of the fundamental right, long recognised under the common law, of liberty for all persons subject only to such limits as are imposed by law. 75 It was therefore stated that consideration of the provisions of Part 4A of the 1987 Act should proceed on the basis that there would be a jurisdiction to grant bail in a suitable case unless that was clearly excluded, expressly or by necessary implication, and it was acknowledged that Part 4A did not contain any such exclusion.
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While it was recognised by the Court that the practical difficulty in determining whether in a particular case bail should be granted would be very real where there was a security risk certificate based on classified security information, that was not seen as dictating a conclusion that the jurisdiction to grant bail must be inconsistent with detention ordered on the basis of a security risk certificate.
Because Mr Zaoui had been in custody for more than 23 months, it was considered that it would be oppressive to let the process be drawn out any more and that further delay should not be countenanced. In the circumstances the Court thus exercised the original jurisdiction of the High Court to grant bail before remitting the matter to the High Court for any continuing supervision.
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The Supreme Court"s approach in Zaoui signifies once again judicial acceptance that fundamental human rights should not be lightly overridden. While the Court was conscious of the need to ensure adequate protection of New Zealand"s security, the emphasis that the right to be free from detention could only be outweighed through a clear statutory direction illustrates judicial acknowledgement of the importance of human rights within the immigration arena.
Legislative Response to the Detention Jurisprudence
The legislative response to the detention jurisprudence has been mixed. Significantly, the Committee expressed concern with the implications of the Supreme Court"s decision in Zaoui. The Committee noted there could be instances where the courts, in considering a warrant of commitment application, could exercise their jurisdiction to grant 78 Immigration Bill (132-1) (explanatory note) at 5. 79 Above n 31 at 27. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid.
bail to a non-citizen. Concern was raised by the Committee that this power could be used to undermine the specific provisions for immigration detention within the proposed legislation.
Accordingly, the recommendation was made that clarification should be provided within the proposed legislation to emphasise that the Bill constituted a code for the immigration detention of non-citizens.
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To briefly summarise the Part 9 provisions, persons liable to arrest and detention are those who are liable for turnaround or deportation, persons who are suspected to be liable for deportation or turnaround and who fail to supply satisfactory evidence of their identity and persons who are suspected of constituting a threat or risk to security. 83 Immigration officers are granted the power to detain such a person for four hours, 84 while a constable has the right to place such a person in custody for up to 96 hours. 85 However, an immigration officer, rather than causing such a person to be arrested or making an application for a warrant of commitment, now has the power to offer reporting and residence requirements as an alternative. 86 Conditions that can be agreed include that a person reside at a specified place; report to a specified place at specified periods or times in a specified manner or provide a guarantor who is responsible for ensuring the person complies with any requirements agreed under the section. The decision as to whether to offer or agree to residence or reporting requirements is stated to be a matter for the absolute discretion of the immigration officer. 87 Such provisions can be seen to indicate a legislative acknowledgement that viable alternatives to detention should be considered. It remains to be seen, however, whether such alternatives will be frequently utilised.
To continue detention of the person after the 96 hour period, an immigration officer may apply to a District Court Judge for a warrant of commitment (or a further warrant of commitment) authorising the person"s detention for up to 28 days. 88 Significantly, a District Court Judge, when determining the application, has the ability to order the person"s release from custody on conditions if he or she is not satisfied that detention is warranted If, upon a successful application for a further warrant of commitment, a person would be detained under consecutive warrants of commitment for a period of more than six months a further warrant of commitment can only be issued if the District Court Judge is satisfied that the person"s deportation or departure is prevented by some action or inaction of the person and no exceptional circumstances exist that would warrant release. 92 If the Judge is not so satisfied he or she must order the person"s release on conditions.
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Part D The obligation of non-refoulement
Not only did the Zaoui litigation illuminate the inherent tension between due process rights and the protection of national security, it also provided the New Zealand judiciary with the opportunity to examine the extent to which New Zealand"s international obligations should be taken into account in decisions regarding deportation of those refugees who might be a security risk.
As mentioned above, a key focus of the Zaoui judicial review proceedings was the security risk certificate that had been issued against Mr Zaoui on the basis that there were reasonable grounds for regarding him as a danger to the security of the country in terms of art 33.2 of the 89 Ibid s 317(1)(b)(ii). 90 Ibid s 318. 91 Ibid, s 318 (3). 92 Ibid, s 323. Note, exceptional circumstances have been defined explicitly to exclude the period of time a person has been detained under Part 9 and the possibility that the person"s deportation or departure may continue to be prevented by some action or inaction of the person: s 323(10). This has been a legislative response to the decision of Chief Executive of Department of Labour v Yadegary [2009] 2 NZLR 495 (CA), which held that the length of detention could fall within the scope of an "exceptional circumstance" under the 1987 Act. This case has not been subjected to substantive discussion in this paper in light of the fact that detainee in question was not a refugee but rather an Iranian overstayer whose actions had prevented his deportation to Iran. Mr Yadegary feared for his safety if he returned to Iran but it had been consistently held that his fears were groundless. 93 Ibid.
Refugee Convention. Mr Zaoui, on the other hand, said that there was a real possibility of torture or loss of life if he was returned to Algeria. This required the courts to engage with the parameters of the exception to the fundamental obligation of non-refoulement encompassed within the Refugee Convention and the Convention"s relationship to other human rights instruments and in particular for the Convention Against Torture (the CAT).
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The Meaning of Article 33 (2).
The exception provided by art 33.2 to the art 33.1 obligation of non-refoulement has generated significant academic discussion post September 11 in light of concerns held by commentators that the judiciary will lean towards an expansive interpretation of the exception in a manner that defeats the rights of refugees. 95 The New Zealand courts had the opportunity during the Zaoui judicial review proceedings to explore the correct interpretation of this pivotal article of the Refugee Convention.
In the Court of Appeal, Anderson P and I held that the art 33.2 assessment required a balancing of the seriousness of the risk to national security with the possible consequences to Mr Zaoui of confirming the risk certificate. 96 We concluded that the security criteria in s 144C(6) of the Immigration Act would be met only if there were objectively reasonable grounds, based on credible evidence, that Mr Zaoui constituted a danger to the security of New Zealand of such seriousness that it would justify sending a person back to persecution.
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We also took the view that there must be a real connection between Mr Zaoui and the identified danger and that an appreciable alleviation of that danger must be capable of being achieved through deportation. 104 The Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the prohibition on refoulement to torture had the status of jus cogens. While it was accepted that there was strong support for the proposition that the prohibition on torture was itself jus cogens, it was held that no support could be found from state practice, judicial decisions or commentaries for the proposition that the prohibition on refoulement to torture had jus cogens status.
Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal rejected the proposition that it was the role of the Inspector-General to do other than decide on the validity of the security risk certificate and thus whether or not Mr Zaoui constituted a threat to national security. 106 Thus, it was not the role of the Inspector-General to decide whether Mr Zaoui"s concerns about torture were justified.
The Crown, however, did accept that it was obliged to comply with New Zealand"s relevant international obligations under arts 6(1) 107 and 7 It must be noted that Haines above n 111 at 82 criticises the decision for failing to address the point that those who have abused human rights are explicitly excluded from the refugee protection regime by Article 1F, and article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention should be seen to illustrate that the obligation of the state to protect a genuine refugee is not an obligation to protect him or her at all costs. He says that the implicit assertion that no matter how grave a danger to the community and no matter how grave a danger to the community an individual may be, the risk of that individual being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or torture trumps all other considerations is not a proposition that is self-evidently correct.
Whether or not this overstates the position, it cannot be denied the decision provides a clear illustration of the New Zealand judiciary actively seeking to ensure that an adequate balance between the protection of human rights and the protection of national security has been met and a willingness to recognise New Zealand"s international obligations under the ICCPR and the CAT. Convention allows the deportation of the person. 125 Similarly, a protected person may be deported to any place other than a place in respect of which there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture or arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment.
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Part E Conclusion
The task of attempting to strike an adequate balance between the right of New Zealand to protect its borders and security and the protection of human rights is one that is inevitably plagued with difficulty. 127 What is certain, however, is the need to ensure that security 121 Ibid, s130. Note, however, that, pursuant to s 130(2), a person must not be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the CAT if he or she is able to access meaningful domestic protection in his or her country or countries of nationality or former habitual residence. 122 Ibid, s 131. Note, however, that pursuant to s 131(2) a person must not be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the ICCPR if he or she is able to access meaningful domestic protection in his or her country or countries of nationality or former habitual residence. Moreover, treatment inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment, unless the sanctions are imposed in disregard of accepted international standards. Further, the impact on the person of the inability of a country to provide health or medical care, or health or medical care of a particular type or quality, is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment. 123 Immigration Act 2009, s 164(1). 124 Note that under s 138(2) regardless of whether the grounds for recognition as a refugee or protected person have been met, the refugee and protection officer may refuse to recognise a person as a refugee or a protected person if he or she is satisfied that the person has the protection of another country or has been recognised as a refugee by another country and can be received back and protected there without risk of being returned to a country where he or she would be at risk of circumstances that would give rise to grounds for his or her recognition as a refugee or a protected person in New Zealand. For greater discussion see Haines above n 4. 125 Ibid s 164(3). 126 Ibid s 164(4). 127 It is necessary of course to be cognisant of the fact that security is not divorced from human rights. Security of the person is a fundamental right in itself and consequently States have a duty to protect the security of those within their borders and also have other international obligations with regard to security more generally. The issue is probably better couched as one involving the balancing of the rights of the collective against the rights of the individual. There is also always, however, the need to overcome the temptation for it to become an exercise of accommodating the fears (as against the rights) of the collective at the expense of individual rights.
